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It is widely acknowledged that the complexity of domestic policy interventions which 
influence trade flows and are now the subject of substantial international negotiation are different 
in their effects from those of tariffs that are widely analyzed by trade theorists. This is especially 
the case in such areas as services, competition policy, environmental regulation, product 
standards, professional accreditation, movement of persons and transportation regulation.  It also 
applies to those areas of agricultural policy where the trade impacts are often significant, despite 
the commitments in the Uruguay Round to tariffy all border measures relating to agricultural 
trade. 
 
Despite such acknowledgements, however, it remains commonplace in numerical 
simulation exercises to analyze the impacts of potential changes in these policies using ad 
valorem equivalent tariff treatment even though estimated impacts using explicit model 
representation and ad valorem equivalent treatments will differ.  The difficulty for modellers is 
that the detail and subtlety embodied in this wide array of policy interventions means that some 
simplification is appealing.  In addition, no meaningful general propositions exist in the 
theoretical literature as to the sign or size of the differences in predicted effects. All that can 
seemingly be done is to investigate the differences case by case, but even here the findings are 
sensitive both to the particular form of model used as well as the model parameterization 
employed.  As a result, there is relatively little in the literature that provides guidance as to how 
serious the pitfalls may be, and how misleading ad valorem tariff equivalent treatment is. 
 
Given the importance of this issue for agricultural policy trade modelling, this is the issue 
addressed in this paper.  In recent years, I have been involved in a number of numerical 
simulation exercises where explicit representation of policy interventions are used and compared 
to ad valorem equivalent modelling, and I draw on these three examples to discuss in broader 
terms what can be involved.  The picture that emerges is large quantitative and even qualitative 
differences in predicted impacts.  I suggest that in the absence of other firm guidance, these 
examples suggest that where interventions differ from a tariff, ad valorem representation be 
undertaken in numerical agricultural trade modelling only with substantial caveats. 
 
 
2.  Geographical Extension of Free Trade Zones as Trade Liberalization
1 
The first example of comparison of explicit model representation and ad valorem 
equivalent modelling draws on a recent paper by Ng and Whalley (henceforth referenced as NW) 
which analyzes the geographical extension of pre-existing free trade zones as a form of trade 
liberalization. NW assesses how this form of trade liberalization compares to more conventional 
trade liberalization involving the lowering of national tariffs covering the whole economy in 
which zones are absent.  The assumption is that countries exist (China being one example) where 
                                                           
1 This section draws on Ng and Whalley who compare their approach to earlier literature on free trade zones such as 
Hamada; Rodriguez; and Young.  
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it is administratively feasible to operate movable internal trade barriers, and that some 
mechanism exists for the progressive enlargement of free trade zones within these countries.  
This can be through the sequential addition of cities or portions of an economy to a pre-existing 
free trade (or export processing) zone. 
 
NW’s paper was motivated by the form that progressive liberalization will take during 
the implementation period for China’s WTO accession commitments in key service areas such as 
banking, insurance, and telecoms (Whalley). For these service items, protection through a tariff 
is not feasible as there is no customs clearance for international trade in the relevant service.  
Prior to WTO accession, China’s domestic markets in these areas were protected by regulatory 
arrangements which relied on licences and limits on the extent of foreign participation (typically, 
the degree of ownership in joint ventures).  Since licences are inherently discrete instruments of 
protection, they have been converted into continuous instruments of progressive liberalization in 
these service areas by allowing for an expansion in their geographical coverage over the five-
year implementation period (allowing more cities over time where foreign presence is allowed).  
Limits on allowable foreign participation (and ownership) are also to be progressively raised 
over time. 
 
NW assumes that such schemes are possible to implement even though in reality they 
may be hard to administer.  China, Vietnam and other countries with strong administrative 
control mechanisms and embedded provincial structures seem to fit this characterization.  NW do 
not explicitly consider intertemporal intermediation services in their model due to the added 
complexity this implies, but instead limit themselves to trade in goods.  NW do emphasize that 
the themes of their analysis of trade in goods, almost certainly applies to trade in services as 
well. 
 
NW consider cases where the size (and hence the border) of the free trade zone can be 
varied inside an economy and numerically evaluate the welfare implications of increasing the 
size of free trade zones and compare this to conventional forms of trade liberalization such as a 
reduction in a national tariff.  They evaluate the welfare impacts of the two types of trade policy 
changes (ad valorem national tariff reduction, expansion of the geographical size of a trade zone) 
where there are observationally equivalent impacts of the two policies in the sense of implied 
identical changes in trade volumes. 
 
To do this, NW calibrate a numerical general equilibrium trade model of a small open 
economy to a base case free trade equilibrium data set.  They then introduce both a free trade 
zone and a tariff and compare the outcome of an expansion in the size of the zone to that 
generated by an observationally equivalent reduction in a national tariff in a model without trade 
zones.  Figure 1 presents a flow chart from NW setting out their procedures. 
 
In NW’s first experiment, the tariff applies to international trade for only a portion of the 
economy and also applies to trade internally between the free trade and protected zones.  Trade 
policy changes involve variations in the size of the free trade zone while the tariff rate in the 
tariff zone remains unchanged.  In analysis using a conventional nationally based tariff with no 
free trade zone, the tariff applies only at the national border and the rate is varied on all country 
trade.  
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Figure 1:  Flow Chart Outlining the Procedures Used  by Ng and by Whalley in  
        Constructing Observationally Equivalent Numerical Experiments Comparing 




















2.  Choose functional forms for 
preferences (CES) and production (in with 
production case) and calibrate the model.  
Tariff Zone Case  National Tariff Case 
3A.  Introduce a tariff zone of 
size λ and a tariff rate t
Z in the 
zone on the importable. 
4A.  Compute a with trade policy 
equilibrium for this case.  Compute 
the Hicksian equivalent variation 
welfare cost of the trade policy 
intervention in money metric terms 
as EV
Z. 
1.  Construction of base case equilibrium 
data set in value terms for a simple free 
trade economy with no trade policy 
interventions.  All world prices set equal 
to one.  
4B.  Introduce a national tariff into the free trade 
economy with a tariff rate t
T, calibrated to give 
the same trade volume impact as for the zone case 
in 4A.  Compute the welfare cost of the 
observationally equivalent trade policy 
intervention in money metric terms as EV
T. 




The numerical simulations of NW show that the welfare changes of observationally 
equivalent trade policy changes differ significantly across the two cases (by factors of over 2).  
There is a larger gain from the first type of liberalization, reflecting both the use of a higher tariff 
rate on a smaller portion of trade, and the reduction in distortions across the divide between the 
free trade zone and the rest of the economy.  NW explore the size of these differences both for 
pure exchange economies where and models with production.  Larger differences occur in the 
case where production is allowed due to added distortions have to do with the location of mobile 
factors across the two zones. 
 
To illustrate NW’s approach, consider a simple single-country pure exchange trade model 
with both international barriers to trade and internally movable barriers and fixed endowments of 
traded goods.  Assume a zone within the economy can be defined in which international trade 
can occur, while trade between the zone and the rest of the economy involves the same tariff as 
applies to international trade.  No tariffs apply in the free trade zone, while in the tariff zone 
there are ad valorem tariffs both on international trade and trade between the zones.  For 
simplicity non-traded goods are excluded from the analysis. 
 
To simplify matters, the relative size of the two zones are represented by the relative 
endowments of goods in each zone (expressed in proportional terms).  Thus, if the economy 
wide endowment is ten units of good one and 20 units of good two, and consumers in the free 
trade zone have six units of good one and 12 units of good two, while those in the tariff zone 
have four and eight units, the tariff zone is treated as covering 40 percent of the whole country.  
A simple treatment is to normalize the size of the whole economy to one.  In the example above, 
the sizes of the free trade and tariff zones are 0.60 and 0.40 respectively.  Because the relative 
size of the two zones are allowed to vary, it further simplifies things to assume that all consumers 
in both zones have identical homothetic preferences. 
 
If Yi defines the aggregate endowment of good i for the whole economy, and λ is the size 
of the tariff zone (and (1-λ) of the free trade zone), the aggregate endowments of goods in each 




i Y Y λ =  and  () i
F
i Y Y λ − = 1   ); ,..., 1 ( N i =   1 0 ≤ ≤ λ  (1) 
where superscript T stands for the tariff zone and F for the free trade zone. 
To facilitate welfare analysis of alternative trade policies, the relative sizes of the free 
trade and tariff zones are assumed to also reflect the relative sizes of the population in the zones.  
There are therefore λ and 1-λ consumers in the tariff and free trade zones respectively, and λ can 
change.  A further simplifying assumption is that the aggregate endowments of each good in 
each zone are evenly distributed. 
 
All consumers are assumed to have identical CES preferences:  
  5
1 1 1

















i i X U      ) ,..., 1 ( N i =     (2) 
where αi is the consumption share of good i; Xi is the quantity of good i; σ is the elasticity of 
substitution, in this economy, utility-maximizing demands for goods depend upon the amount of 
income spent in each zone.  Since consumer prices differ across the zones, the aggregate 
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where 
j
i X  is the aggregate demand for good i in zone j, 
j I  is the income spent in zone j, and 
j
i P  
is the price of good i in zone j. 
 
The income in each zone
j I  is given by: 
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where γ 
j denotes the share of national tariff revenue R collected in the tariff zone accruing to 







2  Hence, the aggregate demand of good i for the whole economy is 
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W
i P  as the world price of good i; and ti as the tariff on good I; the national tariff revenue, R, is 
given by: 
 




i i M P t R         ( 6 )  
The aggregate net import of each good for the whole country, Mi, is given by the sum of 





i i M M    ); ,..., 1 ( N i =   ) , ( T F j =      (7) 
                                                           
2 In the numerical experiments it is assumed that the tariff revenue collected in the tariff zone is only distributed to 
that zone.  In this case, γ 
F = 0 and γ 
T = 1. 
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Since the country is modelled as a small open price-taking economy with no non-traded 
goods, it is simple to characterize an equilibrium.  Given world prices of goods, any excess 
demands for goods are absorbed by imports from (or exports to) the world market.  Trade 
balance is implied by Walras’ Law, which automatically follows from utility maximizing 
behaviour subject to budget constraints.  Given λ, an equilibrium for this economy can also be 
easily computed.  Alternatively, given a target tariff revenue R
* and a tariff rate t in the tariff 
zone, λ can be endogenously determined as the relative size of the two zones needed to meet the 
revenue requirement and the tariff rate. 
 
Trade liberalization in this economy can involve the geographical expansion of the free 
trade zone, a change in the tariff rate, or some combination of these.  If we increase the size of 
the free trade zone from 1-λ to 1-λ’ for a given tariff rate (where λ > λ
’), the size of the free trade 
zone increases while the tariff zone shrinks. 
 
To evaluate the welfare impacts on consumers located in each area of the economy; first 
compute a general equilibrium before and after a trade policy change (i.e. such as the change 
from λ to λ’ respectively) and obtain consumption of each good in both the free trade and tariff 
zones before and after the trade policy change.  Since endowments are evenly distributed within 
each zone and the relative sizes of zones reflect relative population sizes, it is easy to compute 
consumption before and after liberalization.  Second, compute the Hicksian money metric 
welfare measures of the welfare changes for consumers located in each area.  The welfare change 
for the whole economy is then computed by summing these money metric measurements which 
are expressed as a percentage of the economy-wide pre-change income. 
 
NW begin by calibrating a conventional single-country price-taking trade model without 
trade policy interventions to a free trade base case data set.  In the case of a pure exchange 
economy, the model is as described above, with the size of the tariff zone set equal to 0 (i.e. 
λ=0). 
 
They then evaluate the welfare impacts of two types of trade policy change.  In the first 
case (the tariff zone case), they introduce a tariff zone of size λ equal to 0.55 and a tariff rate t
Z 
of 0.6 in the zone for the importable.  They then compute an equilibrium for this case, and 
compare it to the original free trade equilibrium to generate a money metric measure of the 
welfare impact of the trade policy change.  NW then introduce an observationally equivalent 
national tariff (t
T) into the free trade calibrated model giving the same impact on trade volumes 
as in the tariff zone case.  This trade-impact equivalent national tariff rate is calculated to be 
about 0.30 for both the pure exchange and the with production cases.  They then compute a 
money metric measure of the welfare impact of this intervention. 
 
NG’s results show that the welfare costs of imposing a geographically restrictive tariff 
scheme (the tariff zone case) are almost two times larger than those from a conventional national 
tariff with observationally equivalent trade effects (the national tariff case).  This reflects both 
the use of a higher tariff rate on a smaller portion of trade, and the introduction of distortions 
across the divide between the free trade zone and the tariff zone when modeling the tariff zone 
case.  On the other hand, there is a relatively lower national tariff applying at the national border  
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and there are no internal distortions within the country.  Thus, the welfare impacts of 
observationally equivalent trade policy changes differ across the two cases. 
 
NW conclude from our analysis that if trade liberalization is achieved through 
geographical expansion of free trade zones, policy analyzes which study such liberalization in 
national tariff equivalent terms can be highly misleading.  Although more complex intertemporal 
and spatial models are needed to study the services liberalizations associated with Chinese WTO 
accession (banking, telecom, transportation), the analysis nonetheless suggests that analyzing 
liberalization of this form in tariff equivalent terms (as is typically done in the modelling 
literature) is not a satisfactory way to proceed. 
 
3.  Border Delays and Trade Liberalization
3 
The second case study of explicit trade barrier representation and ad valorem equivalent 
modelling draws on work dealing with border delays reported in a recent paper by Cudmore and 
Whalley (henceforth referenced as CW).  The motivation for this study is that in a number of 
lower income and transitional economies it is common for there to be significant delays at the 
border when achieving customs clearance (Hare; and Wolf and Gurgen).  This can be due to 
complex customs formalities, which sometimes are continually changing, capacity constraints to 
process imports given limited facilities, and/or corruption at the border.  In some African 
economies, there are reported delays of 3-6 months to achieve customs clearance, although this is 
perhaps extreme. 
 
The thrust of CW is to argue that if such delays are significant and the length of the delay 
is endogenously determined, then trade liberalization through tariff reductions that increase the 
length of the queue can be welfare worsening.  Tariff reductions, as have occurred in recent years 
in the CIS states, may thus be bad policy if customs clearance issues are not first addressed.  CW 
show this for a small open economy case in a simple general equilibrium model where there is a 
physical constraint on the volume of imports which can be admitted.  They then analyze 
extensions where corruption occurs, and finally where some imports are perishable.  CW apply 
their analysis to data on Russian trade for the late 1990s, with the results emphasizing the themes 
that not only is it best to deal with border and administrative delays first before engaging in trade 
liberalization, but also the quantitative orders of magnitudes for the costs involved can be large. 
 
CW formalize the interactions between border delays and trade liberalization in a simple 
pure exchange economy, which is small and a taker of prices on world markets and engaged in 
trade.  For expositional simplicity goods are assumed traded (these features can be changed in 
further numerical application); the world prices for the N goods are given by the 
w
i π ; tariff rates 
ti apply to imports (ti = 0 for exports), and CW assume the direction of trade is predetermined.
4 
 
                                                           
3 This section draws on Cudmore and Whalley. 
4 This is a standard assumption in most theoretical trade models, although numerically the direction of trade can 
change when trade policies change.  See Abrego, Riezman, and Whalley for a recent discussion of the likelihood of 
this assumption being false in comparisons between free trade, customs unions, and Nash equilibria.  
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In this economy, domestic prices depart from world prices on the import side both due to 
tariffs and per unit queuing costs at the border T
q(π).  For simplicity, CW assumes these costs are 
the same for all goods, and that units for goods are denominated in comparable physical terms 
(e.g. tons).  Thus, if M goods are imported and (N-M) exported, and the direction of trade is 
unchanged, 
 






i T t + + = 1    (i=1………..M).      (8) 
T
q is assumed to be indexed and so is homogeneous of degree one in π and is endogenously 
determined. 
 
The economy has market demand functions,  ( ) Q R
d
i , , π ξ , and non-negative endowments, 
wi, for each of the N goods, where π
d denotes the N dimensional vector of domestic commodity 
prices.  R defines tariff revenues, and Q represents the aggregate endogenously determined 
queuing costs (denominated in units of the good being imported).  These demand functions are 
non-negative, continuous, homogeneous of degree zero in π
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Assuming there is a single representative consumer in this economy, its budget constraint 
is given by 
 
() () ( ) ∑ ∑ ∑
= = =















i w T R w Q R
1 1 1
, , ξ π π π ξ π .     (10) 
For simplicity, border delays are assumed to reflect a constraint on the volume of imports 
that can be processed over the period of time covered by the model (e.g. one year).  Thus, for 
now, consider this to be a physical constraint rather than one reflecting corruption or other 
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q w T Q
1
ξ π  denotes  
the total queuing costs. 
In this model, if the capacity constraint on imports is binding then per unit queuing costs 
T
q(π
w) are determined in equilibrium along with domestic prices 
d π , tariff revenues, and 
domestic demands  i ξ .  The effect of tariff liberalization will be to lower tariff revenues and  
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increased queuing costs.  In the case where tariff rates are uniform across commodities, tariff 
reductions simply generate a corresponding increase in queuing costs.  Since the latter use real 
resources, tariff reducing trade liberalization will typically be welfare worsening. 
 
This simple model is then extended by Cudmore and Whalley in a number of ways which 
capture additional mechanisms through which border delays and trade liberalization can interact.  
One is the presence of corruption.  Another elaboration is differential impacts of queuing on 
different commodities if perishable commodities are more adversely affected by queuing than 
non-perishable commodities.  Differential impacts of border delays across commodities are the 
end result with added distortionary costs. 
 
Using this simple framework, CW make some calculations using Russian data to explore 
the possible quantitative orders of magnitude involved with analysis of trade liberalization that 
incorporates border delays.  The delays reported in the Russian case appear to be lengthy and a 
major restraint on trade.  CW’s calculations serve to underline the point that if tariff reforms 
occur with no attention being paid to administrative considerations and border delays, 
liberalization can be welfare worsening rather than welfare improving as is usually the case in 
conventional models.  Importantly, CW suggest that there are costs rather than benefits from 
trade liberalization in such cases and they can be substantial.  Here again, analyzing trade 
liberalization using conventional tariff based models can also be misleading, and in this specific 
case the sign might even be wrong. 
 
4.  US Wheat Programmes and Programme Participation 
A final case study of ad valorem treatment and explicit trade barrier representation is 
provided by Whalley and Wigle (henceforth referenced as WW) who argued that modelling 
agricultural programmes involves surprising complexities, and that overly simple ad valorem 
modelling can again be misleading.  They illustrated this by discussing the modelling of price 
supports paid to US wheat farmers in the late 1980s.  At this time price support for producers of 
wheat (as well as corn, grain, sorghum, oats, barley, and rye) in the United States were largely 
provided through commodity loans and deficiency payments (USDA).  These jointly had the 
effect of raising prices received by farmers. 
 
Under the Commodity Loan programme, the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) 
made non-recourse loans to farmers using commodities (wheat) as security, stored either on the 
farm or in commercial warehouses.  These loans matured on demand, but on or before the loan’s 
maturity date farmers had the option of regaining possession of their crop by paying off the loan 
plus any accrued interest, or forfeiting the stored commodities to the CCC as full payment of the 
loan.  This component of price supports effectively operated through the setting of the loan rate. 
 
Deficiency payments were based on the difference between the target price and the higher 
of the national average market price and the loan rate.  This difference was multiplied by the 
established yield of each farmer’s land to determine their total deficiency payment.  Prior to 
1985, established yields were frequently recalculated using a five-year moving average of the 
preceding years’ yields on a farm-by-farm basis.  Under this system, subject to a lag, higher  
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yields implied higher deficiency payments.  In effect, marginal output received the support 
(target) price.  One of the major changes in the 1985 Farm Bill was an attempt to “decouple” 
deficiency payments from output by fixing established yields. 
 
However, acreage set asides coexisted with these two methods of price support as a 
condition for receiving support.  To receive deficiency payments on their harvested acreage, or to 
gain access to non-recourse loans, farmers were required to reduce their planted acreage by a 
specific percentage of their base acreage.  The aim of these set-aside requirements was to reduce 
surplus production thought to be generated by the price supports. However, the joint effect of 
deficiency payments, loans, and set asides on output and prices, and hence, on market prices was 
uncertain. Producers participating in the programme planted a reduced acreage but faced a higher 
price, giving ambiguous effects on production. Increasing the target price would increase yields 
of programme participants, but could also increase participation, reducing planted acreage. 
 
To assess the net effect, it was necessary to analyze farm participation decisions. In 
deciding whether or not to participate in support programmes, individual farms compared their 
profits from participating in both the price support and set-aside programmes with their profits if 
they did not participate. This is illustrated in Figure 2.  Thus, if P
W is the target price of wheat 
designated under price supports, P
Z the price of non-land inputs used by all farms and λ the set 
aside rate; the participation decision for farm i involved the comparison of the profit functions 
N
i π , 
P
i π  for farm i under participation (P) and non-participation (N).  If, for farm i, 
 






i P P P P >   (12) 
then farm i  would choose not to participate in the set-aside programme, and would only 
participate if the inequality is reversed. 
 
  Typically farms differed in a range of characteristics, including the crop in which farms 
had a comparative advantage, land quality, and the ease with which land and other inputs could 
be substituted. Typically, for any given level of target and market prices and set-aside rates, it 
would pay some farms to participate and others not. 
 
If farms are ranked by their relative profits from participating and non-participating and 
are indexed by the subscript i,  the distribution of participant and non-participant farms is 
described by the relative profit functions. Changes in programme parameters, such as 
W
T P and λ, 
will shift these relative profit functions, changing the number of participant farms. This 
emphasizes the importance of capturing endogeneity of programme participation in any 
modelling of the impacts of agricultural supports. 
 
  Whalley and Wigle analyzed the effects of price supports and set asides for wheat in the 
United States on both output and the terms of trade, using a numerical general equilibrium model 
of global trade in wheat reported in Trela, Whalley and Wigle, and into which they embedded a 
richer treatment of both farm behaviour and programme supports in the United States. In WW, 
the US wheat sector was assumed to be made up of a number of types of farms, producing a 
distribution both of average yields, and participating and non-participating farms in the model.   
  11
Figure 2:  Distribution of Farms Between Participants and Non-Participants in United  




















For analytical convenience, WW assumed that farms differ only in the elasticity of 
substitution between land and non-land inputs in production. In doing so, WW abstracted from 
differences in land quality across farms, location (and thus transportation costs in shipping 
crops), and difference in comparative advantage across crop types between farms.The production 
technology for each farm type, i, was assumed to be constant returns, and to take the constant 
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where  gi is the output of farm type i, Li  and  Zi  are land and non-land inputs, δ is a share 
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is the elasticity of substitution between inputs. Wheat-producing land (L) and other inputs (Z) 
were assumed to be the sole inputs in the production of wheat by any farm. 
 
Since acreage available to each farm, Li, was fixed, producers faced a two-level 
optimization problem. They must first compare their profit under participation in the commodity 
programme (including any set-aside provisions), to their profit outside the programme. Given 
their participation decision, they then optimize on non-land inputs and outputs. 
 













i Z P L y P − = ˆ π  (16) 
where: 
N
i π  farm i, assuming it does not non-participate in support programmes; 
P
i π  farm i, assuming it 
does participate in support programmes; 
W P is the free (world) market price for wheat; 
W
T P is the 
US target price for wheat;  i y,   i y  are the optimal yields under non-participation and participation 
decisions, respectively;  i L  is the total acreage available for farm I; 
Z p  is the price of other 
inputs;  i Z,   i Z are the total amounts of other inputs used under non-participant and participant 
decisions, respectively;  A is the proportional set-aside requirement; and  i T is the lump sum 
"paid diversion" received by farm i (equal to the rental value of a pre-specified proportion of 
land set aside when complying with set-aside requirements). 
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In this formulation, farm profits equal the returns to land net of input costs. 
 
Participating farms were assumed to receive the target price for incremental output, 
although in some model experiments they varied the degree to which deficiency payments were 
coupled to current yields. 
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and their optimal yield is 
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For participants, their input demands are given by 






















































and their optimal yield is 




























Given the programme parameters PT, and knowing the market price of wheat P
W, and the 
input price P
Z, it is possible to solve for the optimal yields and input demands under participation 
and non-participation. This allows for a comparison of the two profit functions (15) and (16), and 
a determination of the participation decision. This, in turn, allows input demand and outputs to 
be calculated. 
 
Whether farms choose to participate in any configuration of programme supports and set 
asides depends on the level of programme support, the way marginal cost functions change as 
land is idled to comply with set asides, and the lump sum costs which set-aside requirements 
cause. WW assumed that the elasticity of substitution between inputs across farms is uniformly 
distributed over a pre-specified interval. Farms with higher elasticities of substitution had higher  
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average yields, and, given that land is a fixed factor for each farm, these farms had more 
shallowly sloped marginal cost functions. The parameter values they used in the model along 
with the data to which the model is calibrated, implied that low elasticity (high yield) farms 
participated in programme support, while high elasticity farms did not. 
 
WW used the model for counterfactual equilibrium analysis, by calibrating the model to a 
1981 microconsistent equilibrium data set, and then computing counterfactual equilibria for a 
variety of policy changes. They compared results under two different model treatments. In the 
first, all policies in all countries are treated in ad valorem form as price wedges (PSEs), while in 
the second, US Commodity programmes are fully modelled as described above (with 
endogenous voluntary participation). WW analyzed the effects of US intervention in the wheat 
market.  Under explicit programme modelling, output rose when programmes were abolished 
because the increase in production from the extra acreage planted more than offset the fall in 
production due to the decrease in prices received by producers originally in the programme.  In 
the  ad valorem subsidy case, the output of the US wheat sector fell when the subsidy was 
eliminated so long as the world price did not rise by more than the subsidy. 
 
The theme again is the difference between ad valorem equivalent modelling, and explicit 
policy representation, with the difference in representation possibly leading to a difference in the 
direction of change. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
While all economic analysis inevitably involves a simplification from a more complex 
reality, and hence representing trade and other policy non-tariff interventions in ad valorem 
equivalent form is clearly wrong when judged by an absolute standard, we unfortunately usually 
do not know how misleading this treatment might by when we employ it (as we widely do in 
policy analysis). 
 
Here I present three case studies where numerical modelling results allow a comparison 
between the results from explicit policy representation and ad valorem equivalent model 
representation in observationally equivalent models.  Significant differences in size of effect, and 
in some cases in sign appear in the results.  I suggest these results indicate some caution when 
using ad valorem equivalent treatment both in analyzing agricultural trade liberalization and 
trade liberalization of other forms.  
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